Problems involving thousands of null hypotheses have been addressed by estimating the local false discovery rate (LFDR). A previous LFDR approach to reporting point and interval estimates of an effect-size parameter uses an estimate of the prior distribution of the parameter conditional on the alternative hypothesis. That estimated prior is often unreliable, and yet strongly influences the posterior intervals and point estimates, causing the posterior intervals to differ from fixedparameter confidence intervals, even for arbitrarily small estimates of the LFDR. That influence of the estimated prior manifests the failure of the conditional posterior intervals, given the truth of the alternative hypothesis, to match the confidence intervals.
Introduction
By enabling simultaneous tests of whether each of thousands of genes represented on a microarray is differentially expressed across experimental or clinical conditions, advances in biotechnology have lead to increased use of the false discovery rate (FDR) as a solution to extreme multiple comparisons problems. As a result, the statistical community has developed more general and more powerful methods of controlling what Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) called the FDR while proposing new definitions of the FDR (Farcomeni, 2008) . The alternative strategy of estimating rather than controlling the FDR in turn led Efron et al. (2001) to propose estimating the local false discovery rate (LFDR), a degenerate case of an FDR ( §2). Recently, Yanofsky and Bickel (2010) found LFDR estimators to perform well in terms of prediction error computed with gene expression microarray data, and Schwartzman et al. (2009) applied LFDR methods to the analysis of neuroimaging data. (The terminology here follows the empirical Bayes convention of referring to predictors of random quantities such as the LFDR as estimators.) FDR estimation begins with the reduction of the data directly bearing on each null hypothesis to a low-dimensional statistic such as a Student t statistic or a p-value and the specification of a subset of reduced-data space called the rejection region. In a general empirical Bayes framework, the Bayesian FDR (BFDR) is the conditional probability that a null hypothesis is true given that it is rejected, that is, given that its statistic lies in the rejection region (Efron and Tibshirani, 2002) . Relaxing the requirement that all null hypotheses share the same rejection region and instead setting the rejection region of each null hypothesis to the degenerate interval containing only the observed value of its statistic generates a different BFDR for each hypothesis; such a BFDR is called an LFDR (see, e.g., Efron, 2010b; Bickel, 2011c) . The LFDR of a null hypothesis is the conditional probability that it is true given that its statistic is equal to its observed value. Thus, estimates of the LFDR are often interpreted as approximations of fully Bayesian posterior probabilities that could have been computed were a suitable joint prior distribution of all unknown parameters available.
However, from a hierarchical Bayesian perspective, the LFDR estimate suffers as an approximation of a hypothesis posterior probability in its failure to incorporate the uncertainty in the parameters. Similarly, from a frequentist perspective, the point estimate of the LFDR would seem less desirable than an interval estimate of the LFDR since the latter would reflect uncertainty in the true value of the LFDR, and correlations between data of different biological features can introduce substantial variability into FDR and LFDR estimates (Bickel, 2004; Qiu et al., 2005) . Efron (2010a) addressed the problem of estimation accuracy by providing asymptotic bounds on the confidence limits of the FDR in the presence of correlation between statistics. Nonetheless, it is not clear how reporting a standard error or confidence interval for the LFDR of each of thousands of null hypotheses would facilitate the interpretation of the results (Westfall, 2010) .
Fortuitously, as the posterior probability that a null hypothesis is true, the LFDR itself is of much less direct biological interest than is the effect-size parameter about which a hypothesis is formulated. Both the Bayesian and frequentist criticisms that LFDR estimation inadequately incorporates uncertainty in the posterior distribution may be answered by constructing conservative confidence intervals for the effect sizes under the finite-mixture model that underlies LFDR estimation (Efron, 2008) , as Ghosh (2009) accomplished for a mixture of two normal distributions. In contrast with the maturity of empirical Bayes confidence intervals based on continuous distributions of effect sizes (J. K. Ghosh, 2006, §9.2; Carlin and Louis, 2009, § §5.4, 5.7) , the derivation of empirical Bayes confidence intervals from the finite-mixture model has just been conceived (Ghosh, 2009; Efron, 2010b, p. 233) . The present paper takes the development of the latter intervals and complementary point estimates in a new direction by combining LFDR estimates with fixed-parameter confidence intervals.
The next section heuristically motivates the proposed confidence-Bayes hybrid intervals by comparing them to previous posterior intervals based on LFDR estimates. The strong influence of the prior on the latter intervals distinguishes them from the hybrid intervals and is undesirable to the extent that the prior cannot be reliably estimated. More generally, in the absence of a frequency-based prior, many statisticians see the confidence approach as a viable competitor against the Bayesian approach. Although fixed-parameter confidence intervals have valid frequentist coverage and higher statistical power than multiple comparison procedures, they lead to excessive FDRs and LFDRs when the proportion of true null hypotheses is very high. Reconciliation between the approaches is impossible in the pure Bayesian framework since Bayes factors conflict with the usual flat priors, as will be seen in Example 5. The hybrid approach combines the strengths of the two purebred approaches by using the empirical Bayes approach for the subparameter that has a reliable estimate of its prior and the confidence approach for the subparameter that does not. 1 Section 2 also highlights advantages of the fact that the hybrid inter-vals coincide with fixed-parameter confidence intervals when the LFDR estimates are small.
Section 3 more formally presents the new approach. A theory of coherent decisions based on confidence intervals (Bickel, 2012 (Bickel, , 2011a extracts the hybrid intervals and analogous point estimates from the posterior distribution constructed from LFDR estimates such that its posterior intervals, conditional on the alternative hypothesis, are fixed-parameter confidence intervals. The interval and point estimates are thereby shrunk toward the parameter value of the null hypothesis. Lower bounds on frequentist coverage probabilities of the intervals are guaranteed under fairly broad conditions.
Another justification of the approach is offered in Section 4. Objective Bayes reasoning suggests interval estimates that are conditionally equal to credibility intervals derived from default priors, which are usually improper. That represents a generalization of the proposed confidence approach since, from a Bayesian viewpoint, such intervals need not have correct frequentist coverage conditional on the alternative hypothesis. This requirement of the equality of default-prior credibility intervals and interval estimates conditional on the alternative hypothesis unifies the objective Bayesian solutions to the "problem of estimation" and the problem of model selection ("significance") (Jeffreys, 1948, §7.21) . Unlike previous objective Bayesian approaches, such unification enables reporting the same credibility interval whether data indicate that the alternative hypothesis is true or whether it was known to be true prior to observation.
The use of the hybrid interval and point estimates will be illustrated in Section 5 with an application to gene expression data. Section 6 reports a simulation study comparing the hybrid confidence interval and point estimates to their conventional counterparts. Finally, Section 7 closes with a summary of the findings, and Appendix A proves the lower bounds on coverage probabilities claimed in Section 3.3.
Posterior sets from local false discovery rates
Previous LFDR-based approaches to constructing confidence intervals, with relatively minor modifications, fit the following model. Let t 1 , . . . ,t m denote data vectors, p-values, or other observed statistics associated with m biological features such as genes. Likewise, let θ 1 , . . . , θ m denote the m parameters of interest, which are effect sizes such as the degrees of differential gene expression or of the association of a genetic variation with a disease. For a fixed value of θ i , the probability density of t i is f (t i ; θ i ); the random variable of density function f (•; θ i ) will be denoted by T i . The m null hypotheses are θ 1 = θ 0 , . . . , θ m = θ 0 , and π 0 is the prior probability that θ i = θ 0 for any i = 1, . . . , m. The two-groups model says the probability density of
where f 0 (t i ) and f 1 (t i ) are its probability densities conditional on the null hypothesis (θ i = θ 0 ) and the alternative hypothesis (θ i = θ 0 ), respectively (Efron, 2008) .
is generally not a member of the parametric family. In the empirical Bayes setting, π 0 is interpreted not as a subjective probability but rather as the unknown mean proportion of true null hypotheses. Since ψ i , the ith LFDR, is the posterior probability that θ i = θ 0 , Bayes's theorem entails
with the ψ ("psi") standing for ψευδής , the Greek word behind "pseudo," false. The prior probability density p 0 (θ i ) conditional on the null hypothesis is 0 everywhere except at θ i = θ 0 . Also given a prior probability density p 1 (θ i ) conditional on the alternative hypothesis, the parameter of interest has a prior probability density of
The posterior probability density is then
where p 0 (θ i |t i ) = p 0 (θ i ). Again applying Bayes's theorem,
where f 1 (t i ) = f 1 (t i ; θ ) p 1 (θ ) dθ . Posterior intervals formed on the basis of p (θ i |t i ) can be interpreted as candidates for confidence intervals of θ i . For example, the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of θ i randomly drawn from p (θ i |t i ) constitute the limits of a 95% interval. In many cases, the posterior interval is a conservative confidence interval in the sense that it includes the true value of θ i in over 95% of the samples drawn from p (θ i ) and f (t i ; θ i ). In the empirical Bayes approaches of Morris (1983) , Ghosh (2009) , Muralidharan (2010) , and Efron (2010b, §11.4), p 1 (θ i ) and ψ i are not known but are estimated from data to yield an estimate of the posterior interval or a posterior point estimate. The performance of the estimates can then be assessed by simulation.
Example 1. Consider the sampling model in which t i is the realization of a normal variate with mean θ i and unit variance: f (t i ; θ i ) = (2π) −1 e −(t i −θ i ) 2 /2 . Suppose θ 0 = 0 and that the prior of θ i given θ i = 0 is normal with mean −3 and unit variance: p 1 (θ i ) = (2π) −1 e −(θ i +3) 2 /2 , abbreviated as θ i |θ i = 0 ∼ N (−3, 1), for simplicity neglecting the inconsequential fact that N (−3, 1) has support at 0. Efron (2010b, §11.4) noted that θ i given θ i = 0 has posterior density θ i |t i , θ i = 0 ∼ N ((t i − 3) /2, 1/2), which yields (t i − 3) /2 ± 1.645/ √ 2 as the central 90% posterior interval conditional on θ i = 0 in place of the usual 90% confidence interval, t i ± 1.645. He observed that the conditional posterior intervals are much narrower and much more central than the intervals that Benjamini and Yekutieli (2005) constructed to guarantee that the false coverage rate does not exceed 90%. Efron (2010b, §11.4) recommended the use of discontinuous posterior sets each consisting of the union of {θ 0 } and the central posterior interval from p 1 (θ i |t i ). A reasonable (1 − α) 100% posterior set of that type is the one equal to {θ 0 } if ψ i > 1 − α or otherwise equal to the union of {θ 0 } and the central 1 −
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Efron (2010b, §11.4 ) also briefly considered the nonparametric estimation of p 1 (θ i |t i ).
As seen in the example, posterior sets conditional on the alternative hypothesis are not necessarily the same as the usual fixed-parameter confidence intervals. That has two undesirable consequences.
First, there seems to be a logical inconsistency with reporting the usual confidence intervals under circumstances in which the alternative hypothesis is known to be true prior to examining the data but otherwise reporting posterior sets that differ from those intervals even when the estimated local false discovery is so low that it becomes practically certain that the alternative hypothesis is true. In other words, that practice means different confidence intervals are reported if the null hypothesis is found to be false than would be reported if it were already known be false. For that reason, many scientists would instead prefer to report fixed-parameter confidence intervals whenever, for all practical purposes, it has been learned from data that the alternative hypothesis is true. In that case, they will see no reason to make the interval shorter than the usual confidence interval.
Second, posterior sets constrained to comply to a prior p 1 (θ i ) remain biased toward the prior even for arbitrarily low values of the LFDR. This is evident in Example 1: the alternative-conditional posterior intervals are always centered at the midpoint between the observation and the center of the prior. The bias is clearly undesirable to the extent that the true p 1 (θ i ) cannot be accurately estimated. Calling for further research, Efron (2010b, p. 233) pointed out that such estimation tends to be much less reliable than that of the LFDR.
The approach of the present paper directly overcomes both of the above drawbacks of the Bayesian and empirical Bayes posteriors by defining a posterior distribution that, conditional on θ i = θ 0 , yields posterior intervals that are equal to fixed-parameter confidence intervals. Like the above posteriors, the proposed posterior is a mixture with probability mass ψ i at θ i = θ 0 but without requiring the estimation of any p 1 (θ i ).
The simplest such posterior generates a (1 − α) 100% posterior set equal to the degenerate interval
confidence interval for the fixed parameter value. That ensures that the posterior probability of coverage is at least
Example 2. In the sampling model of Example 1, let the posterior distribution of θ i |θ i = 0 be N (t i , 1), the 5th and 95th percentiles of which give t i ± 1.645 as the 90% posterior interval given the alternative hypothesis. Thus, if ψ i . = 0, then θ i has a posterior distribution with all but approximately ψ i of the probability mass the N (t i , 1). It follows that
More generally, confidence sets may be derived from a posterior distribution of θ i without requiring knowledge or estimation of a prior p 1 (θ i ). The Bayesian constraint of the prior is replaced by the requirement that the confidence sets have exact or approximate frequentist coverage conditional on the alternative hypothesis. That requirement ensures that the difference between the confidence set and [θ 0 , θ 0 ] approaches a fixed-parameter confidence interval as ψ 0 → 0. That is accomplished by replacing the Bayesian posterior p 1 (θ i |t i ) in equation (3) with p 1 (θ i ;t i ), a probability density of θ i such that its posterior intervals are exact confidence intervals of any fixed true value of θ i . For example, the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of θ i randomly drawn from p 1 (θ i ;t i ) constitute the limits of a 95% posterior interval that covers the fixed value of θ i under repeated sampling from f (t i ; θ i ). Confidence densities are easily computed from a p-value considered as a function of the null hypothesis value, as will be seen in Section 3.1.
, called the marginal confidence density to distinguish it from p 1 (θ i ;t i ), the conditional confidence density. The LFDR is likewise estimated by replacing π 0 and f 1 with their estimates:
.
Herein, f 0 is considered the known density function of the statistic conditional on the null hypothesis, but it can instead be estimated if m is sufficiently large (Efron, 2004) .
With α = 10%, the posterior sets of Examples 1 and 2 are (1 − α)100% highest-density sets, each of which is the smallest set Θ 1−α (t i ) of real numbers such that
Unless π 0 = 0, any highest-density set will necessarily contain the null hypothesis value θ 0 , provided that p 1 is the probability density function of a continuous parameter. As a result, the practical utility of reporting highest-density sets in applied work is unclear. To enable interpreting coverage of θ 0 as the absence of evidence against the null hypothesis, posterior intervals will be used instead of highest-density sets.
A simple way to construct such posterior intervals from an estimated marginal confidence density is the percentile method mentioned above in the empirical Bayes context. Lower and upper percentiles (e.g., the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles) of random θ i draws from p (θ i ;t i ) are the limits of the proposed marginal confidence intervals. These intervals include non-degenerate intervals such as 95% intervals and, for point estimation by the 50th percentile, degenerate (0%) intervals.
However, Monte Carlo draws from p (θ i ;t i ) are not needed given the confidence limits encoded by p 1 (θ i ;t i ), since Section 3.3 will provide a simple equation for the marginal confidence intervals. The equation (14) is generally applicable since it requires no more than a method of estimating the LFDR and a method of generating fixed-parameter confidence intervals. Let ∧ and ∨ denote minimum and maximum, respectively.
under a fixed-parameter model. (The "1" subscripts emphasize that these confidence intervals are conditional on the alternative hypothesis.) For any α ∈ [0, 1/2], equation (14) implies that the central
where
Example 3. Under the sampling model of Examples 1 and 2, N (t i , 1) is the conditional confidence distribution of θ i |θ i = 0. Thus, the substitution θ 1 (β ;t i ) = t i + Φ −1 (β ) in equation (7) gives the desired marginal confidence intervals. Figure 1 compares them to three other types of set estimators using t i = −2 as the observation from N (θ i , 1). The upper-left plot records the highest-density sets of Example 1. A price paid for its small alternative-conditional posterior sets is the bias toward p 1 (θ i ;t i ) that takes place even for arbitrarily small values of the LFDR. That same bias can be seen in the upper-right plot, in which the posterior intervals are derived from the same posterior distribution but with the constraint of centrality, resulting in intervals in place of discontinuous sets. Those intervals are defined by equation (7) with
. Likewise, the lower-left plot reports the highest-density confidence sets of Example 2, and the lower-right plot reports the marginal confidence intervals specified by equation (7) with θ 1 (β ;t i ) = t i + Φ −1 (β ). By definition, both the discontinuous and the continuous confidence sets are closer to the fixed-parameter confidence intervals for smaller values of the estimated LFDR, as the dashed lines illustrate.
Technically, the shrinkage of the marginal confidence intervals toward θ 0 is as much of a bias as the shrinkage of the Bayesian methods toward their prior.
2 This case involves an anomaly: the small-coverage confidence interval
includes the null hypothesis value even though the LFDR estimate is low. Including θ 0 in the marginal confidence interval resolves the conflict conservatively, i.e., against rejecting the null hypothesis. Due to the rarity of the situation, little or no power is lost. Figure 1 : Four types of 90% posterior intervals or other posterior sets based on the LFDR (Example 3). The intersection between each (estimated) LFDR value and the union of gray regions in a plot is a set estimate of at least 90% posterior probability. The dashed black lines are the limits of the usual 90% confidence intervals, and the solid black lines correspond to t i , the observed statistic. The two plots on the left-hand side display discontinuities at θ i = 0, whereas the posterior sets of the right-hand side are single intervals. The posterior sets in the top two plots exhibit shrinkage toward the prior centered at θ i = −3. In contrast, the LFDR-marginal confidence sets on the bottom two plots only shrink toward θ i = 0. They closely approximate the usual confidence intervals at low LFDRs.
However, since the former shrinkage is toward the parameter value of the null hypothesis, it is desirable to the extent that the LFDR is high since the LFDR is the probability that the null hypothesis is true. The shrinkage shows the desired behavior in the lower-right plot of Figure 1 : it is negligible for small LFDRs and continuously increases with the LFDR. This shrinkage explains the lower point estimation error and shorter confidence intervals seen in Section 6.
3 Theoretical framework
Confidence distributions
Considering the observed data vector x ∈ X n as a sample from a distribution in the parametric family P θ ,γ : θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ parameterized by θ , γ , the value in Θ ⊆ R 1 of the parameter of interest is denoted by θ , whereas the value of the nuisance parameter, if any, is denoted by γ. The function S :
is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1 for any fixed θ , γ ∈ Θ × Γ and if S x is a cumulative distribution function on Θ for all x ∈ X n . Due to the latter property, the significance function evaluated at x is also known as the "confidence distribution" (Fraser, 1991; Singh et al., 2005) , but Efron (1993) and Schweder and Hjort (2002) used that term in the sense of the following probability distribution. Given any x ∈ X n , the confidence distribution P x is the probability measure on measurable space (Θ, B (Θ)) of a random quantity ϑ such that P x (ϑ ≤ θ ) = S x (θ ) for any θ ∈ Θ, where B (Θ) is the Borel σ -field on Θ.
The symbol ϑ distinguishes hypothetical parameter values of posterior distribution P x from θ , the true value of the parameter. It is easy to verify that
holds for all θ , γ ∈ Θ × Γ and for every x ∈ X n and every α 1 and α 2 in [0, 1] such that α 1 + α 2 < 1. Whereas the left-hand side is the familiar probability that a (1 − α 1 − α 2 ) 100% confidence interval includes the fixed parameter of interest, the right-hand side is a non-Bayesian posterior probability that the parameter of interest lies within the post-data confidence interval. To distinguish the posterior probability P x (ϑ ∈ [θ , θ ]) of the specified hypothesis that θ ∈ [θ , θ ] from a confidence interval of a specified confidence level 1 − α 1 − α 2 , Polansky (2007) called the former an observed confidence level.
The observed confidence level is not written as
since that would normally represent a Bayesian posterior probability. While some confidence distributions are equal to Bayesian posteriors, others cannot be equated with any Bayesian posterior without making the prior data-dependent (Lindley, 1958) .
As a Kolmogorov probability measure on parameter space, the confidence distribution yields coherent decisions in the sense of minimizing posterior expected loss, as does the Bayesian posterior, and yet without dependence on any prior distribution (Bickel, 2012 (Bickel, , 2011a . For example, the confidence distribution mean, minimizing expected squared error loss, is Θ ϑ dP x (ϑ ), and the confidence distribution p-quantile, minimizing expected loss for a certain function of p (Carlin and Louis, 2009, App. B) , is S −1 x (p). The term "confidence posterior distribution" emphasizes this use of P x (Bickel, 2012 (Bickel, , 2011a , but the redundant word "posterior" is dropped in this paper to simplify the terminology as much as possible.
Example 4. Assume that Y j , the observable, log-transformed difference in levels of expression of a particular gene between the jth individual of the treatment group and the jth individual of the control group, is a normally distributed random variable of unknown mean θ and unknown variance σ 2 . For the observed differences y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ X = R, the n-tuple x = y 1 , . . . , y n is thus modeled as a realization of X = Y 1 , . . . ,Y n , with Y i independent of Y j for all i = j. Then the one-sample t-statistic τ (X; θ ) has the Student t probability distribution of n − 1 degrees of freedom for any θ ∈ R since the distribution of X depends on θ through Y i ∼ N θ , σ 2 . The significance function S and confidence distribution P x satisfy
for all θ ∈ R. The right-hand-side is the usual expression for the upper-tailed pvalue with θ as the null hypothesis value of the interest parameter.
To apply the formalism to high-dimensional biology, model x i ∈ X n , the ith of m observed data vectors each corresponding to a gene or other biological feature, as a sample generated by P θ i ,γ i . Here, θ i ∈ Θ is the value of the interest parameter, and γ i ∈ Γ is the value of the nuisance parameter. The ith null hypothesis asserts that θ i = θ 0 , where θ 0 may be any specified value in Θ.
Extended confidence distributions
The use of confidence distributions as conditional distributions given the truth of the alternative hypothesis leads to estimated posterior probabilities that each parameter of interest is less than, equal to, and greater than the parameter value of the null hypothesis. Such probabilities are coherent with each confidence distribution given the truth of the alternative hypothesis according to the confidence-based decision theory of Bickel (2012) and Bickel (2011a) .
To establish that, some additional notation is needed. For all i = 1, . . . , m, let A i denote a random quantity equal to 0 with probability π 0 and to 1 with probability π 1 . Then ψ i = P (A i = 0|T i = t i ) succinctly defines the LFDR as the posterior probability that the ith null hypothesis is true. For any set S, the indicator function 1 S is defined by 1 S (θ ) = 1 if θ ∈ S and 1 S (θ ) = 0 if θ / ∈ S. Consider the probability distribution P (i) of which each P x i is equal to a conditional probability distribution of ϑ i given θ i = θ 0 , of which δ θ 0 , the Dirac measure at θ 0 , is a conditional probability distribution of ϑ i given θ i = θ 0 , and according to which ψ i is the probability that θ i = θ 0 . That is, P (i) (A i = 0) = ψ i and, for all θ ∈ Θ,
(Equation (10) has P x i (ϑ i ≤ θ ), not P x i (ϑ i ≤ θ |A i = 1), since the distribution of A i is specified by P (i) , not by P x i , which only specifies the distribution of ϑ i |A i = 1.) More concisely,
Thus, P (i) , the marginal posterior distribution of the parameter of interest, follows from applying Kolmogorov probability theory to the base distributions ψ i , 1 − ψ i , δ θ 0 , and P x i . For that reason, decisions made on its basis are those that would be required for coherence by the base distributions in the framework of minimizing expected loss with respect to a confidence distribution (Bickel, 2012 (Bickel, , 2011a and, more generally, with respect to any parameter distribution (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Savage, 1954) . For example, as the posterior median S −1 x i (1/2) minimizes the expected absolute loss involved in estimating θ i conditional on A i = 1, the median of P (i) does so marginally. Thus, P (i) will be called the marginal confidence distribution and P x i the conditional confidence distribution given the truth of the alternative hypothesis. Adapting the terminology of Polansky (2007) concerning fixed parameters of interest, P (i) -probabilities and P x i -probabilities of hypotheses will be called (observed) marginal and conditional confidence levels, respectively.
Since ψ i is unknown, the marginal confidence distribution will be estimated by
which resembles the marginal empirical Bayes posterior from which Ghosh (2009) derived conservative confidence intervals under a parametric model. (Efron (2008) similarly derived empirical Bayes interval estimates conditional on A i = 1 in order to contrast them with estimates that control a false coverage rate (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005) .) The two posterior distributions differ in that P x i is a confidence distribution rather than the Bayesian posterior P true (•|A i = 1, T i = t i ), which requires specification or estimation of P true (•|A i = 1), a prior distribution of θ i conditional on the truth of the alternative hypothesis. From an empirical Bayes viewpoint, the substitution of the confidence distribution for the true posterior is no more objectionable than the substitution of the point estimate ψ i for the true LFDR ψ i , as Section 4 argues. P (i) -probabilities of hypotheses will be called "marginal confidence levels" even though they are more precisely estimates of such levels. To make the connection with Section 2, Radon-Nikodym derivatives of P x i , P (i) , and P (i) respectively define the confidence density functions p 1 (•;t i ), p (•;t i ), and p (•;t i ), in which dependence on x i apart from t i is suppressed.
Example 5. Generalizing Example 4 to multiple genes, let x i denote the n-tuple of log-transformed differences in levels of expression of the ith of m genes. The ith null hypothesis is that the ith gene is equivalently expressed (θ i = 0) as opposed to differentially expressed (θ i = 0). Further, let P x i denote the corresponding confidence distribution defined by equation (9) and the normality and conditional independence assumptions of Example 4. P x i is mathematically equivalent to the Bayesian posterior P true (•|A i = 1, T i = t i ) formulated by the uniform "distribution" (Lebesgue measure) as the prior for θ i and integrating over the standard deviation σ with respect to the posterior from the independent prior density proportional to 1/σ . Since the prior is not a Kolmogorov probability distribution, the estimated posterior odds given by multiplying the estimated prior odds (1 − π 0 ) / π 0 by the Bayes factor is undefined (Berger and Pericchi, 1996; Yanofsky and Bickel, 2010) . Thus, there is no prior distribution that corresponds to P (i) in this example. Nonetheless, Section 4 argues that P (i) is reasonable and coherent from an objective Bayesian viewpoint. used a predictive distribution on the basis of an intuitively motivated posterior equivalent to P (i) to assess the performance of various predictors of gene expression data.)
Interval and point estimates
Were the marginal confidence distribution P (i) known, its mean and median would respectively minimize expected square-error and absolute loss incurred by estimating θ i ( §3.1) , and the odds for betting that θ i lies in some subset Θ of Θ would be P (i) (ϑ i ∈ Θ ) /P (i) (ϑ i ∈ Θ\Θ ), a ratio of two observed marginal confidence levels (Bickel, 2012) .
Those decision-theoretic considerations suggest estimating θ i by the mean or median of P (i) and constructing the (
Thus, by equations (10), (11), and (13),
Inverting S (i) gives, for any β ∈ [0, 1],
where S x i is the significance function defined in Section 3.1. Thus,
may be written as equation (7), in which S −1 x i is denoted by θ 1 (•;t i ). While the P (i) -probability that ϑ i lies in the interval estimate is exactly (1 − α 1 − α 2 ) 100% by construction, it does not have exact frequentist coverage. However, the following two limiting cases suggest that the marginal confidence interval covers the random value of θ i at a relative frequency greater than the nominal rate (1 − α 1 − α 2 ) 100%. With P true as the joint distribution of θ i and X i ,
for any 0 < β < 1. To the extent that 1 − π 0 is small, the actual coverage rate
is dominated by the rate conditional on A i = 0. For that reason, equation (16) indicates that, inasmuch as ψ i is conservative and π 0 is large, the confidence intervals derived from P (i) are conservative in the sense that they include the random value of θ i at a relative frequency higher than the nominal (1 − α 1 − α 2 ) 100% level. To make this precise for the symmetric case at some α = α 1 /2 = α 2 /2, the α-conservatism of ψ i conditional on the null hypothesis is
for any α ∈ [0, 1]. A widely applicable condition on the conservatism of the LFDR estimator is sufficient for conservative confidence intervals:
Corollary 1. Let π 0 denote a lower bound of π 0 . If
for some α ∈ [0, 1], then R (α/2, α/2) ≥ 1 − α.
The proofs are collected in Appendix A. The practical relevance of these results is discussed in Section 7. (An anonymous reviewer pointed out that equation (18) can be simplified. The present formulation makes it easier to see that the righthand side is approximately c (α) π 0 if α 1 or if π 0 ≈ 1.) Likewise, the P (i) -posterior median S −1 (i) (1/2), corresponding to the degenerate 0% confidence interval S −1 (i) (50%) , S −1 (i) (50%) , is conservative in the sense that a positive bias in ψ i pulls the estimate S −1 (i) (1/2) toward θ 0 . The extent of the conservatism of both point and interval estimates was quantified by simulation as described in Section 6, complementing direct estimates of bias in nonparametrically estimating π 0 (Pawitan et al., 2005; Yang and Bickel, 2010) .
4 Bayesian effect-size estimates 4.1 Bayesian posteriors in place of confidence distributions Equation (13) can be broadly interpreted in terms of the general problem of formulating effect-size point and interval estimates on the basis of ψ i , any approximate posterior probability that the ith null hypothesis (or narrow model) is true, and P x i , any distribution of the interest parameter given the alternative hypothesis:
for i = 1, . . . , m. Thus, effect-size estimation reduces to the problem of generating a P x i given ψ i . Here, m can be as small as 1 since this general problem of choosing P x i is not merely a multiple comparison problem. Whenever effect sizes are of interest, this problem occurs in many, but not all, forms of Bayesian model selection and averaging. The problem of specifying a P x i for use with ψ i does not arise in completely subjective Bayesian analyses in which all priors are proper (integrating to 1) and known. It does arise, however, in the use of proper priors when sensitivity to the prior is a concern. In that setting, P x i is chosen to mitigate the influence of the prior behind ψ i . The problem also arises in objective Bayesian analyses involving improper priors.
This section sketches a general Bayesian approach to generating P x i in order to derive effect-size estimates from equation (20). First, some methods of generating the ψ i in the equation are reviewed.
Because improper priors are often incompatible with the Bayes factors needed for Bayesian model selection and model averaging, as in Example 5, various pseudo-Bayes factors have been developed for objective Bayesian inference. The best known pseudo-Bayes factors use some information in the data to convert the improper prior to a posterior and treat that posterior as a proper prior to be conditioned on the remaining information (Berger and Pericchi, 1996; O'Hagan, 1995) . Many minimum-description length methods yield codelength differences that can serve as logarithms of pseudo-Bayes factors (e.g., Bickel, 2011b) , though the original motivation is usually different. While those methods tend to be conservative in the sense that they favor the null hypothesis, anti-conservative pseudo-Bayes factors are also available (Kass and Wasserman, 1995; Aitkin, 1991) . (The posterior Bayes factor (Aitkin, 1991) is the Bayesian analogue of the implied likelihood (Efron, 1993) .) Since pseudo-Bayes factors do not completely comply with Bayes's theorem, they leave open the question of how to use them for effect-size estimation.
Let π 0 denote an estimate of or specified value of the unknown π 0 = P true (A i = 0). For example, π 0 = 1/2 is often used in the m = 1 case. Let B 0 denote a pseudo-Bayes factor such as one of those mentioned, a Bayes factor based on a specified proper prior that may not be entirely satisfactory, or, consistent with Section 3, an estimate of the true Bayes factor
According to Bayes's theorem,
is the corresponding posterior probability of the null hypothesis. It is substituted into equation (20) for purposes of effect-size estimation. The only quantity remaining to be specified is P x i , which is chosen to cohere with contemporary Bayesian reasoning and practice. This is accomplished by letting P x i , the data-based distribution of the interest parameter conditional on the alternative hypothesis, be the Bayesian posterior distribution derived from the default prior that would have been used were the alternative hypothesis known to be true.
Such default priors may be uniquely determined by invariance, conservatism, or other desirable properties, and they are typically improper (see, e.g., Kass and Wasserman, 1996) . While B 0 could not have been derived from an improper prior by a simple application of Bayes's theorem, the coherence of decision making in influential accounts of Bayesian decision making (e.g., Savage, 1954) is fully preserved since P (i) is a Kolmogorov probability distribution.
In conclusion, the point and interval estimates derived from a default prior are no less Bayesian than is the widely recommended practice of replacing a prior that fails a model check. Both approaches represent coherent responses to situations in which mechanically updating the parameter distribution by Bayes's theorem is unjustified or at least impractical.
Effect-size matching
The Bayesian posterior P (i) can now be compared to the marginal confidence distribution P (i) . Assuming that each uses the same value of ψ i , equations (13) and (20) indicate that the Bayesian and confidence approaches only differ in whether the alternative-conditional posterior distribution is the default-prior posterior distribution P x i or the fixed-parameter confidence distribution P x i . Thus, the approaches yield the same effect-size estimates if P x i = P x i . For instance, the mixture distribution derived from the default prior in Example 5 is a marginal confidence distribution.
However, since not all confidence distributions correspond to Bayesian posteriors, there are marginal confidence distributions that conflict with Bayesian reasoning. By the same token, since not all Bayesian posteriors generate credibility regions with correct frequentist coverage, satisfaction of Bayes's theorem does not imply that a distribution is a marginal confidence distribution. In short, although the proposed confidence and Bayesian effect-size estimates agree completely in some cases, alternative-conditional confidence is neither necessary nor sufficient for alternative-conditional Bayesian updating of a default prior.
Application to gene expression
Microarray technology enables measurement of the expression levels of thousands of genes for each biological replicate, an organism or pool of organisms considered as a unit. Most microarray experiments are designed to determine which genes to consider differentially expressed across two conditions, conveniently called treatment and control. Investigators initially relied on estimates of an average ratio of expression under the treatment condition to that under the control condition without using hypothesis tests. As statisticians have responded with extensive research on multiple comparison procedures, biologists have moved to ignoring estimated levels of differential expression for all genes that do not correspond to rejected null hypotheses.
In response, Montazeri et al. (2010) proposed shrunken estimates of differential expression levels, much as Strömberg et al. (2008) and Wei et al. (2010) suggested shrunken estimates of odds ratios. Whereas Montazeri et al. (2010) , following Bickel (2008) and Yanofsky and Bickel (2010) , used a heuristic estimate equal in value to the confidence distribution mean with respect to P (i) , the posterior median has the advantage of invariance to reparameterization. Johnstone and Silverman (2004) noted desirable hard-thresholding properties of posterior medians in the high-π 0 setting. Since, in addition, the confidence distribution median is a degenerate confidence interval ( §3.3), it will be used as the point estimate alongside the interval estimate.
Interval estimates are needed to quantify the uncertainty in the parameter values. In place of the commonly used confidence intervals that do not account for multiple comparisons, we will report the shrunken confidence intervals of equation (14). Alba et al. (2005) studied gene expression responses to a mutation related to fruit development using microarrays. How much the expression of a gene differs between mutant tomatoes and wild type (WT) tomatoes was recorded for n = 6 mutant-WT ("treatment-control") pairs at 3 days after the breaker stage of ripening. Each microarray records measurements over 13,440 genes, 12,277 of which I retained for statistical data analysis since they each have at least two non-identical observed mutant-WT expression ratios. Alba et al. (2005) provide details of the fruit development experiments conducted.
Due to the pairing of mutant and WT biological replicates, the normal model and confidence distributions of Examples 4 and 5 were used. The local false discovery rates were estimated by the "theoretical null" method of Efron (2007) since simulations indicate that the "empirical null" method applied to the model of Examples 4 and 5 loses more statistical power in the presence of heavy-tailed data like that of gene expression (Bickel, 2011a) .
Each circle of Figure 2 represents a point or interval estimate of θ i for a gene. The left-hand side displays the posterior median of ϑ i versus ψ i on the basis of each marginal confidence distribution P (i) (black) and each conditional confidence distribution P x i (gray). Stronger shrinkage is evident at higher values of ψ i .
The right-hand side of Figure 2 features the width of the confidence interval from each P (i) versus the width of the confidence interval from each P x i . It is apparent that the use of the marginal confidence distribution in place of the conditional confidence distribution tends to substantially reduce interval width. In Figure 3 , observed marginal confidence levels are plotted against observed conditional confidence levels to show how much inferential probability each attributes to the hypothesis that θ i < 0 and to the hypothesis that θ i > 0. The horizontal axis has P x i (ϑ i < 0), which is equal to P (i) (ϑ i < 0|A i = 1) and to 1 − P x i (ϑ i > 0). The vertical axis has P (i) (ϑ i < 0) in black and P (i) (ϑ i > 0) in gray; these marginal confidence levels do not total 100% since P (i) (ϑ i = 0) = ψ i > 0. 
Simulation study
Levels of gene expression and corresponding observations were simulated for 2000 gene expression experiments each with π 0 = 90% probability that any gene is equivalently expressed, n = 2 biological replicates, and m = 10 4 genes, as follows. For each experiment, the mean differential expression levels θ 1 , . . . , θ m were assigned 0 with probability π 0 , −2 with probability (1 − π 0 ) /2, and +2 with probability (1 − π 0 ) /2. Then, for each i = 1, . . . , m, the n observed expression levels represented by x i were drawn from N θ i , σ 2 i , where σ i = 1 if θ i = 0 and σ i = 3/2 if θ i = 0, in accordance with Examples 4 and 5. The posterior medians S −1
x 1 (50%) and S −1
(1) (50%) and the 95% confidence intervals S −1 x 1 (2.5%) , S −1 x 1 (97.5%) and S −1 (1) (2.5%) , S −1 (1) (97.5%) were computed for each simulated experiment. The total numbers of experiments simulated and analyzed were 2000 for independent θ 1 , . . . , θ m and x 1 , . . . , x m and 2000 for extremely correlated θ 1 , . . . , θ m and x 1 , . . . , x m . In each of the latter experiments,
x block 500 if i = 10 4 − 19, . . . , 10 4 with independent θ block 1 , . . . , θ block 500 and x block 1 , . . . , x block 500 , thereby reducing the effective number of features by a factor of 20. To assess the influence of the proportion of true null hypotheses, all of the simulations and analyses were repeated for π 0 = 99% using the same seed of the pseudo-random numbers.
Figures 4 and 5 consist of histograms of the posterior median errors S −1 (i) (1/2)− θ i (black) and S −1 x i (1/2) − θ i (gray) according to each marginal confidence distribution P (i) and each conditional confidence distribution P x i , respectively. The left panel corresponds to 1 − π 0 = 10% and the right panel to 1 − π 0 = 1%. Figures 6 and 7 give the width of the confidence interval from each P (i) versus the width of the confidence interval from each P x i for 1 − π 0 = 10% (left) and 1 − π 0 = 1% (right). Each circle corresponds to a simulated experiment. As seen in the application to gene expression ( §5), the marginal confidence intervals tend to be much shorter than the conditional confidence intervals.
The smaller intervals do not compromise frequentist coverage in the independentstatistic case. On the contrary, the confidence intervals from P (i) cover the simulated values of θ i at rates higher than the nominal 95% level (Table 1) , as suggested by equations (15) and (16). These results are discussed in Section 7. 
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Discussion
As an extension of both a confidence distribution and an empirical Bayes posterior, P (i) offers new approaches to two related problems in high-dimensional biology. First, the problem of estimating effect sizes was addressed by using the P (i) -posterior means or medians as point estimates. Since a point estimate for an individual feature of scientific interest is difficult to interpret without quantifying the uncertainty in the parameter value, the problem of reporting interval estimates consonant with the point estimates was handled by constructing the confidence intervals of each feature to have the posterior median at its center. The confidence intervals based on P (i) are not only centered at the point estimates, but also tend to be much shorter than the fixed-parameter confidence intervals on which they are based, as seen both in the application to gene expression ( Figure 2 ) and in the simulation study ( Figure 6 ). In spite of their shortness, the shrunken confidence intervals cover their target parameter values at rates higher than those claimed, at least under test statistic independence (Table 1) .
The fact that the coverage rate is π 0 in the presence of the extreme form of correlation (Table 1) indicates an almost total inability of the LFDR estimator chosen for illustration to reject the null hypothesis in that environment. The problem may be substantially mitigated by replacing the semiparametric LFDR estimator with a parametric estimator such as the MLE of a discrete mixture with each component from a particular family of distributions (see, e.g., Muralidharan, 2010) . Simulations indicate that models of that type perform well for small numbers of features (Bickel, 2011d) and for large numbers of features with the type of correlation used in Section 6 (Yang and Bickel, 2010) . Since positive correlation has the same effect as reducing the number of features, semiparametric LFDR estimators specifically designed for small numbers of features (Bickel, 2011c) may yield better coverage rates. The use of these alternative estimators as the ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m in effect-size estimation via equation (13) invites future investigation.
The coverage rate is guaranteed to be at least the nominal rate claimed under a general condition that applies to finite samples and finite numbers of features (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). The sufficient condition is simple and can be checked for any particular method of estimating the LFDR given π 0 , a lower bound for π 0 . That is most easily accomplished by approximating the conservatism (17) under various plausible simulation settings. The choice of π 0 depends on the specific application. In genome-wide association studies, the proportion π 0 of SNPs not associated with a trait is thought to exceed 1 − 10 −4 (Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium, 2007) . With gene expression data analysis, the proportion π 0 of equivalently expressed genes is often assumed to be at least 90% (e.g., Efron, 2004) , though lower proportions can be possible for particularly disruptive treatments. It is worth emphasizing that the guaranteed lower bounds of coverage probabilities do not need the conditional confidence distribution but apply equally to the objective Bayes generalization introduced in Section 4.
Some caution is needed in interpreting P (i) (ϑ i < θ 0 ), P (i) (ϑ i = θ 0 ), P (i) (ϑ i > θ 0 ), and other observed marginal confidence levels as posterior probabilities for decision-making purposes. Since the LFDR estimate ψ i is conservative in the sense that it has an upward bias (Pawitan et al., 2005; Yang and Bickel, 2010) , the P (i) -probability of any hypothesis that includes or excludes θ 0 will tend to be too high or too low, respectively. For example, there is no warrant for concluding from P (i) (ϑ i = θ 0 ) = ψ i = 100% that the null hypothesis is true with absolute certainty (Bickel, 2011a; Yang and Bickel, 2010) , and the observed conditional confidence of Figure 3 and studied by Bickel (2011a) would thus perform better in terms of any loss function that infinitely penalizes predicting an event with certainty that does not occur.
In summary, both the proposed hybrid effect-size estimates and their objective Bayesian counterparts rest on the same foundations: 1. A reliable estimate or approximation of the posterior probability of each null hypotheses is available. That could be an LFDR estimate or a posterior probability derived from a pseudo-Bayes factor. 2. A reliable method of generating either confidence intervals or credibility intervals based on a default prior is also available, but the generated intervals are only suitable conditional on the alternative hypothesis.
3. Generally applicable methods of point and interval estimation are generated by coherently combining the two methods (Items 1 and 2) by means of the law of total probability.
The confidence-Bayesian estimates and objective Bayesian estimates of Item 3 are equal to each other if their null hypothesis probabilities are equal (Item 1) and if the conditional confidence intervals match the credibility intervals based on a default prior (Item 2).
